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LENDER'S TITLE INSURANCE

extend it. It is significant that, from the many arguments presented by
the petitioners,54 the Court chose to reply to three relatively minor arguments that related to the racial neutrality of the courts because the replies
underscore the Court's distaste for attributing the racial prejudices of the
testator to the courts responsible for supervising the disposition of his
property.55 This may be indicative of a changing attitude of the Court
which will tend to give the equal protection clause a rest while relying
more on legislation to eliminate racial discrimination. Recent civil rights
legislation"5 certainly makes this feasible.
GEORGE

S.

KING, JR.

Insurance-Judicial Construction of the Lender's Policy of
Title Insurance
The recent trend of judicial interpretation of standard insurance
policies has been to construe policies liberally in order to provide more
comprehensive coverage for the insured. Although the courts have depended upon various principles of contract interpretation to accomplish
this end, the import of adjudication in this field reveals a sound propensity
of the courts to protect the consumer. The brunt of the criticisms of insurance practices has recently fallen upon the underwriters of liability
insurance. However, a recent case, Paramount Property Co. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co.,1 expands the criticisms of liability insurance
policies to encompass the provisions of the standard lender's policy of title
'

In their... briefs, the petitioners . .. have advanced several arguments

ich we have not here discussed. We have carefully examined each of these
arguments, however, and find all to be without merit.
396 U.S. 435, 448 (1970).

" To the contention that the Georgia courts had violated the Constitution by

making the "anti-Negro choice" with regard to the uncertain intent of the testator,
the Court replied that there was no constitutional obligation to resolve doubts in
favor in of integration. To the argument that the decision the trust had failed rested
on a premise by the court that integration would destroy the desirability of the
park to whites, the Court said that it was the desirability of integration to the

testator alone that caused the trust to fail. In response to the prediction of loss
to the public of many charitable trusts, the Court pointed out that state courts were
free to use or not use cy pres as they normally would. 396 U.S. 435, 445-47 (1970).
50
Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. V,
E.g.,
E
1970) ; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5,
28 & 42 U.S.C.).
(in bank). Paramount
1 1 Cal. 3d 562, 463 P.2d 746, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970)
relies heavily upon a recent case construing a liability insurance policy. Gray v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (in bank).
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insurance.' Although the disposition of the particular fact situation involved is essentially just, the express and implied analogies that the court
has drawn between the principles underlying the two types of insurance
are not altogether accurate; thus, specific aspects of the decision necessitate
further clarification.
The facts of the case succinctly illustrate the nature of title insurance
for the lender, as well as depict problems of interpretation that may arise
in even a relatively straight-forward, standardized contract. The defendant
title insurance company had issued two standard lender's policies to the
plaintiff, Paramount Property Co., one for each of two deeds of trust that
had been delivered to Paramount by third parties to secure a loan. Subsequently, one Guibbini, alleging ownership of the land, filed a quiet title
action declaring that the deeds of trust were invalid. During the pendency
of the suit, which the title insurance company defended in accord with its
obligation,3 Guibbini paid Paramount the amount of the indebtedness due,
received a reconveyance of the trust deeds, and dismissed his action without prejudice. This transaction enabled Guibbini to clear record title to
the parcels of land in preparation for their sale. After selling one parcel,
Guibbini commenced a new action, only two months after the first, to
recover the amount paid. He claimed that Paramount's lien was invalid
on the identical grounds stated in the previous action, and, in addition, he
contended that he paid the debt under duress,-that Paramount knew or
should have known of the invalid lien but, realizing that Guibbini could
not sell the property until he removed the cloud on the title, continued to
assert its claim. The title insurance company, standing by the explicit terms
of the policies, declined to defend in Guibbini's second suit. Paramount
successfully defended this action and thereafter brought suit against the
title insurance company for reimbursement of the costs of the defense.
Paramount's action against the title insurance company raised the
issue of the proper construction of several provisions of the standard
lender's policy of title insurance.4 The standard policy contained the
following termination clause: "Payment in full by any person or voluntary
satisfaction or release by the Insured of a mortgage covered by this policy
shall terminate all liability of the company to the insured owner of the
2 1 Cal. 3d at 566 nn.2 & 3, 570 n.6, 463 P.2d at 748 nn.2 & 3, 751 n.6, 83 Cal.
Rptr. at 396 nn.2 & 3, 399 n.6. These provisions are those of the AMERICAN LAND
TITLE ASSOCIATION [hereinafter cited as ALTA] MORTGAGEE POLICY 1962 (Rev.
7(d) & 3(d).
1968 & 1969) paras. 4(a),
2
8 1 Cal. 3d at 566 n. , 463 P.2d at 748 n.2, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.2.
'Id. at 565, 463 P.2d at 747, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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indebtedness secured by such mortgage ... ."' The policy also excluded
from coverage "[d] efects known to the insured either at the date of this
policy or at the date such insured acquired an ...interest insured by this
policy . . . ."' Relying on these two clauses, the title insurance company
offered two basic defenses: First, since there had been a "payment in full"
according to the unambiguous language of the policy, the coverage had
terminated. Second, even if the policy were in full effect, Guibbini's complaint alleged that Paramount knew or should have known that the title
was defective, thus bringing the case within the latter mentioned exclusion
from coverage. The court of appeals found no ambiguity in the termination clause and adjudged that the policy had terminated ;7 the California
Supreme Court, in reversing, decided that the policy had not terminated
and that the title insurance company did have a duty to defend.
In resolving this first issue of the case, the court found that the accepted
practice of paying a debt in full to remove a cloud on the title and immediately suing for a refund' did not constitute a payment in full as was
contemplated by the parties to the contract. 9 The court conceded that in
most circumstances the termination clause would operate in a straightforward manner, but the unique situation at bar created an ambiguity in
the clause in light of the purpose of the contract ° and the reasonable expectations of the parties." Thus the court ruled that only a final and unconditional payment should be considered a "payment in full." By

'ALTA

MORTGAGEE POLICY para. 7(d) (emphasis added).
"Id. at para. 3(d).
Paramount Prop. Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 894 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1969).
8 See Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959).
1 Cal. 3d at 567-69, 463 P.2d at 749-50, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98.
1
oThe purpose of title insurance is to protect the insured from loss growing out
of an undiscovered defect in title to the insured property. 1 Cal. 3d at 568, 463
P.2d at 750, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 398. The statutes of many states reflect this definition,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-132 (1965). For comparable definitions see J. MAGEE
& D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 548 (7th ed. 1964); Johnstone, Title
Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492 (1957).
1 Cal. 3d at 568, 463 P.2d at 750, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 398; see, e.g., Harris v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 1956); Boeing Airplane
Co. v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 44 Wash. 2d 488, 268 P.2d 654 (1954) ; 3 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 545, at 164 (1960) ; 1 IESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(b)
(1932). The rules established for the construction of written contracts are also
applicable to policies of insurance. See generally 43 Am. JUR. 2d Insurance §257
(1969). Since a title insurance policy is a contract of insurance rather than a
suretyship, rules of contract interpretation apply. See DeCarli v. O'Brien, 150 Ore.
35, 41 P.2d 411 (1935) ; Foehrenbach v. German-American Title & Trust Co., 217
Pa. 331, 66 A. 561 (1907).
1
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purporting to discern the reasonable expectations of parties to a contract
under the particular circumstances involved, the court has, in effect,
implemented a policy of protection for the insured. Nevertheless, to augment the impact of this decision on future cases that may call upon the
courts to construe any provision of the standard lender's policy of title insurance, the court reinforced its reasoning with the established principle
that ambiguous insurance contracts are to be resolved against the insurer."2 However, except for the reference to the ambiguities involved
in the contract, the court did not illuminate the rationale behind this
principle nor explain its applicability to the case. Basic contract law
provides that where language is ambiguous it will be construed against
13
the party who drafted it.
The insurer almost always provides the contract, but because the insurer has the further advantage of being, in
most situations, the stronger party in a setting of extreme disparity of
bargaining power, the courts have perceived a contract of adhesion 14 and
have found for the insured upon observation of the slightest ambiguity
in language, or the comparatively small size of print or the location of
certain provisions.' 5 The courts advocating the doctrine have come
dangerously close to writing a contract for the parties, but they have
recognized that, in reality, the insurance company is a highly professionalized institution'0 issuing a standardized, technically phrased contract
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis which is rarely, if ever, understood by the
layman who pays the premium.'
Notwithstanding the magnanimous intentions of the courts, one might
1 1 Cal. 3d at 570, 363 P.2d at 750, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
18
See 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 621, at 760 (Jaeger ed. 1961).
"When the stronger party drafts the contract, ambiguities will be construed
in favor of the weaker party. See Patterson, The Interpretationand Construction
of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 833, 855-61 (1964); see also Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesio-Som,e Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,43 CoLum. L. REv. 629
(1943). The basis of the doctrine of contracts of adhesion is suggested by Isaacs,
The Standardizingof Contracts,27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917). See, e.g., Aschenbrenner
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U.S. 80, 84-85 (1934); First Nat'l Bank v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 416 F.2d 52, 56 (5th Cir. 1969).
" E.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 878, 377 P.2d 284, 294, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172, 182 (1962) :"If [the insurer] deals with the public upon a mass basis,
the notice of non-coverage of the policy, in a situation in which the public may
reasonably expect coverage, must be conspicuous, plain, and clear." Cf. Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
" The insurance company is obviously more highly skilled in the field than the
layman. See 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4687 (1962).
"'E.g.,Coniglio v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 596, 599, 182 P. 275, 276

(1919).
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reasonably argue that the doctrine of contracts of adhesion should not be
applied to the standard lender's policy of title insurance. 8 An explanation
of the origins and subsequent development of the ALTA Loan Policy
offers a point of departure for such an argument. The real estate boom
in the United States after World War I provided a lucrative outlet for life
insurance companies eager to invest their funds, and since they were
obligated to go to the land, these companies expanded their operations far
from home localities. To protect their investments against loss from
defects in title they required broad insurance coverage and, because of the
diverse insurance practices throughout the nation, a standard policy.' 9 In
response to this demand, four large life insurance companies drafted the
Life Insurance Company Standard Loan Policy (L.I.C. Policy).2 ° In
1929 the American Title Association (now the American Land Title Association) in concert with the four life insurance companies responsible for
the L.I.C. Policy, drafted a standard lender's policy of title insurance
which incorporated the elements of the L.I.C. Policy.2 ' The ATA immediately prepared to present its standard policy to all life insurance
companies lending money on first mortgages, as well as to all real estate
mortgage companies in general.' That the individual title insurance company should adopt the form was assumed: "The Association is going to
exert every effort to secure its adoption and requests for its use from the
loaning agencies, and trusts that every title company will immediately
adopt and put into use as their sole mortgagee's form."
It is interesting to note that the size of the print and the general form
of the first ALTA policy compare closely to those aspects in the recent
ALTA Loan Policy which were criticized by the court in Paramount.
Also included in the policy of 1929 was the provision contained in the
present policy regarding termination of insurer's liability upon payment in
full or release by the insured. It is true that the title insurance industry
24
largely owes its expansion in recent years to the institutional lenders,
28

See Johnstone, Title Isurance,66 YALE L.J. 492, 504-05 (1957).
Henley, What Investors in Mortgage Loans Are Demanding in Title Insurance,
35 TITLE NEvs, May, 1956, at 12.
2
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Prudential Insurance Company, Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, and John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company. See The Awrican Land Title Association Stardard Loan
Policy of Title Inmsrance, 8 TITLE NEws, July, 1929, at 5.
' 8 TITLE NEWS, July, 1929, at 5.
10

22 Id.

28

Id. at 10.

Glendining, Title Inmurame in Massachasetts,3 BosT. B.J., April, 1959, at 21.

2"
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but, in turn, the lenders have continued to demand active participation with
the ALTA in the revisions of the standard lender's policy and to push
for maximum coverage.2 5 The title insurance industry has, with some
consternation, been cognizant of these efforts."6
There is, of course, no precise answer to the question of whether the
policy of title insurance for the lender should be viewed as a contract of
adhesion27 in the same manner as, for example, the liability insurance
contract. However, the cursory analysis of the court should be clarified
to determine the impact of its decision on future construction of the
policies. The provisions of the ALTA Loan Policy have been written into
the policies of almost every title insurance company in the United States.2 8
It would seem unjust to rely on a blanket application of the rule that an
insurance contract is resolved aganist the insurer when the insurer may
not have a bargaining position superior to the insured, and when the form
contract in question is not fully written nor developed by the insurer.
It is true that the above rule has been generally applied in the construction
of insurance contracts, title insurance policies included, but most courts
have stipulated that the rule is applicable because the insurer alone drafts
the policy and presents it to a consumer who has no choice but to accept
it.2 9' Furthermore, the insured lending institution is a member of a power-

ful industry and is hardly in the same weak position as the individual
0

consumer.3
The second basic question resolved in Paramountis whether or not the
" E.g., Henley, Report of Chairman, Committee on Title Insurance Standard
Forms, 40 TITLE NEWS, Jan., 1961, at 130; see also Schuenke, What a Life Insurance
Company
Requires.. . , 48 TiTLE NEws, Mar., 1969, at 18.
20
Henley, supra note 19.
7
1n contrast to the ALTA Loan Policy, the ALTA Owner's Policy seems more
analogous to a contract of adhesion. For example, the lender's policy, basically a
rewritten L.I.C. Policy, was drafted before the owner's policy. Insurance rates
are also lower for the lender than for the owner. Although the difference in rates
exists partly because the risk terminates more quickly for the lender, the risk for
the lender decreases as the debt is paid, and, in the case of the lender, the insurer
has a chance to salvage losses through debt assignment. One authority attributes
the difference to the greater bargaining power of the lender. Johnstone, supra note
18, at 504. Finally, the coverage for the owner is slightly less than for the lender.
23
Johnstone, supra note 18, at 504.
sE.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co .v. Hercules Powder Co., 224 F.2d 293, 294 (3d Cir.
1955); Heffron v. Jersey Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 5, 9 (E.D.S.C. 1956); Gould Morris Elec. Co. v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 518, 520, 50 S.E.2d 295, 297 (1948) ;
Marandino v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Corp., 156 Va. 696, 700, 159 S.E. 181, 182
(1931).
"' Cf. Navin, Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts,48 N.C.L. REV.
505, 524-25 (1970).
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title insurance company had a duty to defend under a policy in full effect.
The court understandably had little difficulty finding that the title insurance company had violated its duty to defend in light of a recent and
important California case, Gray v. Zurich InsuranceCo.,"1 which made this
duty absolute in the field of liability insurance. Before Gray, the duty to
defend was generally determined by the allegations of the complaining
party.3 2 The title company in Paramount apparently adhered to this
position, and the underlying issue of both Gray and Paramountis identical
-in both cases the complaints of the third parties alleged intentional acts
excluded from coverage by the policies. The court in Gray held that
the allegations of the complaint are not determinative of the duty to
defend since, under the modern rules of civil procedure, the facts of the
case are stressed rather than the theory of recovery set forth in the complaint.33 Therefore, as long as there remains a reasonable potential of
liability, the insurer is obligated to defend. In Gray the doctrine of
contracts of adhesion provided the primary support for this position. The
liability insurance policy in Gray, as do most liability insurance policies,
contained the following provision in the insuring clause: "[T]he company shall defend any suit against the insured.., even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent."3" The court construed this opening, broad promise to defend to be incompatible with
the less conspicuous exclusion from coverage of an intentional act on the
part of the insured, and the ambiguity was resolved, according to the
established rule, in favor of the insured. The court in Paramount
justified its holding by relying on Gray's reference to the modern rules of
civil procedure and by supporting this reiteration of Gray with a simple
analysis of the facts involved. 5 Nevertheless, by an almost dogmatic
reliance upon Gray with respect to the above issue, the court has at least
opened the door for future decisions to extend the duty to defend under
a standard policy of title insurance where the claim against the insured
alleges facts more clearly outside express terms of the policy. Modem
rules of civil procedure alone may warrant such decisions, but the ALTA
54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (in bank).
419 P.2d 168,
-- 65 Cal. 2d 263,APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §4683 (1962);
2See 7A J.
Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458, 465, 497 (1956).
88 65 Cal. 2d at 276-77, 419 P.2d at 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13. See F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.11, at 85-86 (1965).
8,65 Cal. 2d at 267, 419 P.2d at 170, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
s Since the complaint of Guibbini did not say when Paramount knew or should
have known of the invalid lien, the facts alleged may possibly fall within the terms
of the policy. See ALTA LoAN POLICY para. 3(d).
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policy does not contain the broad and ambiguous promise to defend,
heavily relied upon by Gray, nor does the doctrine of contracts of adhesion apply without question to the lender's policy.
The ALTA has been aware of judicial criticisms of insurance policies,
and the recently drafted ALTA Policies of 1970, the Owner's Policies
(Forms A and B), the Loan Policy, and the new Single Form Policy
reflect an attempt to anticipate these criticisms. The revisions attempt
to clarify possible ambiguities in the form of the policies, rather than limit
coverage. All the policies expand and make more conspicuous the insuring
clauses to include immediately reference to the exclusions from coverage.
The purpose behind this revision is to thwart the possible judicial ruling
that the fine print of an exlusionary clause is inconsistent with the bold
print promising to insure, with the result that the exclusionary clause
is ignored. 30 The 1970 ALTA Loan Policy and the 1970 Single Form
Policy continue to contain the provision terminating the insurer's liability
when there is payment in ful 3 7 but the provision is under the subheading

"Reduction of Liability" rather than under the subheading found to be
ambiguous in Paramount, "Payment of Loss."3" The 1970 ALTA
Policies generally define the purpose and the scope of the coverage with
more exactness. At any rate, the scope of the coverage as well as the
form of the policy of title insurance for the lender are not controlled by
the individual title insurance companies to the extent that a court should
mechanically resolve ambiguities it might find in even revised policies in
favor of the lending institution.
CHRISTIAN NESS

Labor Law-The Right to an Unbiased Tribunal in Union
Disciplinary Proceedings
A significant weakness in union disciplinary procedure has been the
"All of the 1970 ALTA Policies contain as the first sentence of the policy
the following provision: "SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND
THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HEREOF .... "
"' ALTA LOAN PoLIcY-1970 para. 8; ALTA SINGLE FoRm PoLIcy-1970 para.
8.
"" 1 Cal. 3d at 569-70, 363 P.2d at 571, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 399.

